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Introduction and Literature Overview
The recent global nancial crisis, which is already being compared in magnitude and possible long-term consequences to the Great Depression, has exposed the weaknesses of nancial markets as well as their regulatory framework. In particular, it has become clear that minimum capital requirements in their current form are not sucient to keep banks from increased risk-taking and, as safety buers, to protect banks from default. The loss absorption capacity of the banking system is by now widely considered to be too low.
In addition, capital regulations may have even contributed to the severity of the recent crisis: it is widely accepted that capital requirements are pro-cyclical (Bec and Gollier (2009)), and thus amplify business cycle uctuations (Blum and Hellwig (1995) , Kashyap and Stein (2004) and Heid (2007) ). In the light of above considerations a major overhaul of the system of capital requirements and more generally of the structure 1 of bank regulation has been agreed upon and is to be implemented over the coming years (Basel Committee (2010) ). Under Basel-III capital requirements will be tightened in various ways and a rst step has been made to create a less pro-cyclical regulatory framework. At the same time the plans to implement this new system have triggered a wide set of questions: will tightening requirements turn out to be an impediment for economic growth in the long term? Will it delay recovery in the short term? Will it reduce or even eliminate pro-cyclicality of the system? What will in fact be the impact on actual capital ratios? Will banks respond by increasing their capital or will they just absorb the new rules by lowering already existing buers they hold in excess of current regulatory ratios?
While answers to most of these questions will require a general equilibrium framework, any general equilibrium eects will be triggered by changes in the banks' actual capital levels. In this paper we focus entirely on this issue, i.e. we investigate the direct impact of minimum requirements on banks' capital choices, before general equilibrium eects come into play. We believe that a precise analysis of the actual capital's dynamics in presence of capital regulations is a necessary rst step towards further welfare analysis and policy implications. For example, if in equilibrium banks' actual capital responds more than one-to-one to a raise in minimum requirements, the pro-cyclical character of capital regulations will be additionally magnied, which in turn should be taken into account when deciding on changes in regulatory capital ratios.
Without a thorough investigation of the relation between regulatory and actual capital no good answers to questions about impact of capital requirements on output growth, cyclicality or the severity of nancial crises can be given.
The literature does not devote much space to a detailed analysis of the eects of regulatory capital on banks' actual capital choices: so far it is standard to assume that capital minima have an eect on banks'
capital decisions only if they bind, i.e. when economic capital preferred by banks in absence of regulations is below the regulatory minimum. In such case it is usually assumed that banks set their common equity at the level exactly equal to the latter (Elizalde and Repullo (2007) 1 ).
On the contrary, one of the stylized facts is that banks hold own capital in excess of the regulatory minimum. This in turn is explained by banks' attempts to avoid costly consequences of not meeting capital requirements, such as increased funding costs, lowered ratings, regulatory penalties and compulsory recapitalizations (Lindquist (2004) conrms this hypothesis for Norwegian banks). Still, despite empirical evidence, most of the economic literature assumes zero excess capital buers. Positive buers, if introduced, are obtained via capital adjustment costs (Estrella (2004) ), xed ex-post nes for not meeting capital requirements (Milne (2002) ) or random audits by regulators (Milne and Whalley (2001) ). However, while yielding positive excess capital levels, these solutions are mechanical and lack realism in resembling true regulatory procedures used in case of a requirements' violation. A notable exception from this critique is a recent paper by Repullo and Suarez (2012) , who obtain positive buers in a multiperiod setting, where banks cannot recapitalize on an ongoing basis. Positive excess capital emerges as a result of banks' precautionary strategy. Nonetheless, the buers in Repullo and Suarez (2012) move procyclically (i.e. are higher during expansion times), which is against the empirical evidence available at this point (e.g Lindquist (2004) ).
1 Elizalde and Repullo (2007) do obtain positive excess capital for some parameter values, but this is achieved by imposing a severe closing rule on banks. Once the closing rule is relaxed, actual capital is always equal to the maximum of economic capital and regulatory capital).
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This study attempts to ll the abovementioned gap in the analysis of capital regulations. We do it by introducing regulatory and market penalties for not meeting capital requirements. We show that in presence of such penalties banks have direct incentives to keep capital always above the regulatory minimum.
Imposed regulatory penalties are assumed to be temporary and proportional to the size of violation, which aims at representing properties of the regulatory penalties used in practice.
For this purpose we construct a partial equilibrium model of the banking sector. Although this restrains us from a proper evaluation of the welfare implications of capital regulations, we believe that this setting is well-suited for analyzing and fully understanding the rst-order eects of minimum requirements and ex-post penalties, i.e. via their impact on actual capital. It should be seen as a starting point on the way to developing a general equilibrium model, in which questions about the macroeconomic impact of capital regulations can be answered.
The results of our analysis show that incorporating regulatory penalties to the nancial sector model yields actual capital choices that can be supported by empirical evidence. We also investigate the capital requirements currently in force. In our model the countercyclical buer envisioned under Basel-III provisions will signicantly reduce (although not eliminate) the pro-cyclicality of capital requirements. Another key result is that in presence of ex-post violation penalties the market disciplining role of Tier 2 capital is severely restricted. In fact, increasing the required level of the Tier-2-type of capital (as recently proposed by the European Commission 2 ) almost entirely eliminates its market disciplining role in our framework.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the proposed bank's optimization problem; Section The outburst of the recent nancial crisis has provoked a discussion on macroprudential policies that would prevent the nancial system from similar breakdowns in the future. Galati Turning to theoretical analysis, Milne and Whalley (2001) show that in their continuous-time setting with random regulatory audits of capital levels and xed ex-post penalties banks hold a buer of free capital above the regulatory minimum. Estrella (2004) considers a bank's optimal capital choice in a model with capital regulation, where capital and dividend payments adjustment costs are present, but he focuses on the pro-cyclical character of capital regulations. Although both random audits with xed nes and capital adjustment costs introduce additional motive for keeping excess capital over the regulatory minimum, the two solutions lack realism in resembling the consequences of breaking capital regulations observed in practice. As it will be argued in Section 3, regulatory measures used towards banks that do not meet capital requirements are temporary and aimed at restoring the bank's nancial soundness rather than worsening the bank's condition by taking more capital from it (for example via nes). From this point of view capital adjustment costs can be seen as an additional channel magnifying the impact of ex-post penalties on banks' behavior. The transition between states is governed by a transition matrix calibrated on US data.
Model structure
We consider a nancial sector with innitely many equally-sized intermediaries (possessing the same intermediation technology) and focus on the problem of the representative bank. In this simple partial equilibrium model banks serve as intermediaries between investors (where we distinguish between depositors, subordinate debt owners and shareholders), who want to make prots on their capital holdings, and rms, who need capital to nance their investments. Each period a fraction p t of rms defaults, in which case the representative bank is able to recover only a part of invested capital. Given the realized return on its portfolio, the bank next repays its creditors. While depositors and subordinate debt owners are paid according to the promised interest rates or interest rate schedule, shareholders are entitled to the bank's dividends that are left once the other two types of creditors have been paid. The bank defaults if it is not able to repay depositors, who have priority in return payments. Otherwise the bank continues operating in the next period. The bank also faces a regulatory authority that puts a minimum requirement on the bank's own capital choice. If the bank's common equity falls below the regulatory level at the end of the period, the intermediary is subject to a penalty. Events that take place in the model are summarized graphically in Figure 1 :
The bank's optimization problem: the period t timeline.
The next two subsections present the representative bank's optimization problem in detail.
Balance sheet structure
Banks serve as capital providers to rms. In particular, assets of the representative bank consist of loans to rms (l t ) that pay a xed gross interest rate r. In each period a fraction p t of loans defaults, in which case the bank is able to recover only a share λ of its invested capital. The period t return from a unit of a loan hence equals (1 − p t )r + p t λ. As in Elizalde and Repullo (2007) we assume that p t is a random variable with the distribution derived from the single risk factor model in Vasicek (2002) with meanp (unconditional default probability of a single rm in the portfolio) and correlation coecient ρ (exposure to the systemic risk). The Vasicek (2002) model is also the theoretical setting used by the Basel Committee to derive both Basel-II and Basel-III capital requirements, which adds realism to our analysis of capital regulations.
The bank nances its intermediation activity from three sources:
• deposits (d t ) that pay a gross interest rate r d t ,
• subordinate debt (e t ) that pays a gross interest rate r e t (which is conditional on the performance of the bank's assets),
• common equity (k t ) that comes from capital injections from shareholders, who in return receive exclusive rights to the bank's dividends.
All players, i.e. banks, capital holders and rms are risk-neutral and maximize their expected prots from investment decisions. The balance sheet clearing condition implies that l t = k t + d t + e t . The structure of the balance sheet is presented in Figure 2 :
Assets Liabilities loans to rms l t deposits d t subordinate debt e t common equity k t Figure 2 : The bank's balance sheet A bank goes bankrupt if the current period return from its activities is lower than the gross return owed to depositors :
In case of a default shareholders and subordinate debt owners lose their all invested capital and the bank stops operating forever. This happens as the bank in our model does not hold any cash (apart from the gross return from its portfolio) it could use to pay its debts. Alternatively, one can think of this closure rule 
Deposits are fully insured by the government and hence depositors are paid back their invested capital by the national insurer if the bank defaults. As their capital is fully insured, the risk-neutral depositors are always paid the risk-free interest rate, which -for simplicity of exposition -is assumed to be xed and equal
The gross rate of return on loans, r, is chosen to assure a positive intermediation margin, δ > 0, i.e. the dierence between the average gross rate of return on the bank's portfolio and the interest paid on deposits:
Because of deposit insurance, depositors do not have incentives to control the portfolio risk taken by the bank and do not require a higher interest rate for a higher default probability. This is not the case for subordinate debt owners, whose payments are conditional on the bank's performance. The interest rate paid on subordinate debt increases with the probability of a bank's default and thus subordinate debt can be viewed as a market disciplining tool: in order to reduce the interest rate on subordinate debt e t the bank will have to increase the amount of own capital to increase its distance to default (lower the probability of a default). Payments to subordinate debt owners are explained in detail in Section 2.4.
2.4 Maximization problem
For simplicity of calculations the period t value of liabilities, l t , is normalized to 1. Each period, given the corresponding interest rates r, r d , r e t , the bank's manager chooses k t and e t as fractions of total assets (d t then follows from the balance sheet identity: d t = 1 − k t − e t ) such that the current value V t of its future increments to net worth,is maximized:
where 1 r k is a discount factor, with r k being the cost of equity, equal to the expected return required by shareholders of the bank. For simplicity it is assumed to be xed over time. Equity is always more costly than other sources of funds as shareholders face higher uncertainty over returns than other funding providers (r k > r d and r k > r e t ). Next, n t+i stands for the bank's increment in net worth (as a fraction of the bank's assets l t+i ) at the end of period t + i, i.e. the dierence between the common equity at the end of period (k t+i ) and at the beginning of period (k t+i ).
Normalizing the value of bank's total assets each period to 1 considerably simplies the optimization problem (3) that has to be solved numerically (see Section 4 for details). In particular, we can treat each period's bank capital decision independently from past values of retained earnings, end-of-period common equity level, etc. It also allows us to avoid considerations of bank capital accumulation over time 4 . The price we pay for those advantages is that, within such setting, we cannot analyze size eects, i.e. the impact of capital regulations on the size of bank's lending activity. Taking i = 0 it follows that (given n t = k t − k t and after normalizing l t = 1):
After the choice of the liabilities structure in period t has been made, the defaulting fraction of assets, p t , is realized and the end-of-period common equity k t is calculated. Given k t the following three cases can be distinguished:
Returns from loans to rms allow the bank to repay depositors (they receive the full amount r d d t ) but are not sucient to fully repay the subordinate debt owners, in which case subordinate creditors receive the remaining part of returns:
The common equity falls to zero: k t = 0. Shareholders lose their invested capital, but the bank keeps operating in the next period. As we only consider the liabilities structure choice of the bank (which is made each period independently of previous periods) and do not analyze the size of the bank's lending activity, we assume that shareholders recapitalize the bank each time its capital falls to zero.
• case III:
The bank is not able to repay neither subordinate creditors nor owners of deposits, in which case k t < 0, the bank is closed down by the deposit insurance agency so the bank stops operating forever, and shareholders and subordinate debt owners lose their capital.
The term R i in the objective function (3) represents the probability that the bank will continue to be allowed operating in period i given that it has survived all preceding periods, and thus equals for all i ≥ 1):
Summarizing all three cases, payments to subordinate creditors are equal:
where the interest rate on subordinate debt, r e t , satises the no-arbitrage condition between deposits and subordinate debt:
Subordinate debt owners require an interest rate that will alwaysbe higher than the interest rate on deposits for two reaasons: rst to compensate for possibly lower payments even when the bank does not default (the rst term on the LHS of equation (5)). And second, they also recognize that the bank can default and demand a correspondingly higher interest (the second term on the LHS of equation (5)). Based on (5) the subordinate debt interest rate can be derived numerically for each pair of deposits and subordinate debt levels.
Moral hazard problems
We introduce a moral hazard friction between the bank's manager and its creditors, which leads to an endogenous funding structure (leverage constraint). Following Gertler and Karadi (2011), we assume that each period the bank's manager is able to embezzle a fraction of its assets, θ t (c t ), that is a function increasing in the ratio of subordinate debt over the bank's total assets: c t = et lt
. One possible justication of such specication is that by giving less discretion over payos, short-term deposits yield more control over the bank's managers than subordinate debt does.
Capital holders correctly internalize the possibility of a fraud and in order to invest their funds with the bank they impose a leverage constraint on the bank such that:
Condition (6) says that creditors will only supply funds to the bank if the manager has no incentive to embezzle the bank's assets: this happens when the bank's continuation value at period t exceeds or equals the current value of assets that might be embezzled (the walk-away value). When this constraint holds, the manager always chooses to continue bank's operations over diversion of funds. For the baseline model specication we follow Gertler, Kiyotaki and Queralto (2011) and assume the following form of θ t (c t ):
which means that the embezzled fraction of assets is a convex function of the subordinate debt's ratio over the bank's assets, with a minimum at c t = 0 (no subordinate debt). We proxy the impact of subordinate debt on corporate governance problems by imposing dθt dct = ε + κc t > 0, so that the fraction of funds that can be diverted (and thus the attractiveness of doing so) is increasing with the amount of subordinate debt chosen.
3 Economic, regulatory, and actual capital
The main objective of this study is to analyze dierences between capital ratios chosen by banks in absence of capital regulations and capital ratios preferred once the minimum capital requirements are introduced. In this section we hence present a brief description of dierent concepts of capital to be investigated within the theoretical framework constructed in Section 2.
Concepts of optimality
The central analysis of this study is limited to the following concepts of capital. Economic capital is the capital level that would be chosen by the bank in absence of capital requirements. It is a function of the set of parameters: {p, λ, ρ, r d , r k , r, ε, κ} 5 . In absence of regulations the bank's optimization problem is represented by the following Bellman equation:
subject to the incentive constraint (6) and the balance sheet clearing condition (d t + k t + e t = 1). The bank's current period value V t is maximized w.r.t. the liabilities structure and it consists of three parts: the common equity brought in at the beginning of period by the shareholders (with a negative sign, as the bank's objective is to maximize the dierence between the end-of period and the beginning-of-period capital), the discounted expected value of end-of-period prots and the discounted expected value of continuing the bank's operations in the next period (V t+1 ).
Regulatory capital corresponds to the minimum capital ratio imposed on banks by the nancial regulator. We focus on the common equity requirement, denoted by k reg , which is modeled to resemble the Basel Committee provisions on Tier 1 capital. Thus, it is risk-sensitive and calculated for a given condence level.
Under Basel II the condence level is equal to α = 0.999, meaning that a bank is expected to not be able to cover its losses and default at most once every thousand years. More precisely, if p * denotes the threshold fraction of the defaulting rms in the bank's portfolio for which P r(p t ≤ p * ) = 0.999, then k reg is set to
is the large homogenous portfolio approximation of the loss rate distribution function derived in Vasicek (2002) 6 :
In the above formula ρ is the systemic risk exposure,p is the individual (unconditional) probability of a loan default equal for all loans in the portfolio and Φ(·) is the cdf of the standard normal distribution. The multiplier φ ∈ [0, 1] represents the fact that under Basel Accords only a fraction (φ = 0.5 for Basel II) of the total capital minimum has to be in the form of common equity. The term 1 − λ represents the size of losses that occur due to defaults in the bank's portfolio and that have to be covered.
It follows that regulatory capital k reg is a function of the set of parameters:{λ,p, ρ, α, φ}. Finally, in our model capital requirements aect the capital ratio chosen at the beginning of each period, independently of the realized defaulting fraction of assets, p t , so the capital ratio chosen at the beginning of the period may dier from the one that is realized at the end of the period.
Actual capital is the capital (ratio) chosen by the bank as a result of maximizing (8) subject to the incentive constraint (6), the balance sheet clearing condition and the minimum capital requirement:
6 As in our model realizations of pt are also drawn from the Vasicek (2002) distribution, we implicitly assume that the regulator's model used to calculate minimum requirements correctly internalizes the true process governing the random variable, pt.
We argue there are several rationales for the actual capital ratio to be dierent from the regulatory minimum. The rst reason for positive excess capital (k t > k reg ) is stressed in Elizalde and Repullo (2007):
for suciently low values of the condence level, α, the regulatory minimum will be below the economic capital ratio preferred by the bank in absence of regulations. In that case actual capital will be set at the level of economic (i.e. unconstrained) capital. It follows then that the required capital ratios do not have any impact on bank's capital choices if they are below actually observed ratios in the ER framework. On the other hand, once capital requirements exceed the economic capital ratio and become binding, the bank will always choose its actual capital to be equal to the regulatory minimum, implying zero excess capital in the Elizalde and Repullo (2007) setting.
But banks cannot control capital levels at every point in time and so they may incur regulatory penalties even when actual capital levels are set ex-ante to comply with regulatory minima, for example if (in our setup) loan defaults are higher than anticipated. Therefore, in fear of possible regulatory penalties, banks may choose to keep excess capital over the regulatory minimum for all levels of risk in the economy and also for low condence levels.
This is exactly what is happening in our model: regulatory penalties for not meeting capital requirements ex-post, which we introduce in Section 3.2, form an additional motive for banks to keep extra capital above the regulatory ratio. The minimum capital requirement condition combined with the ex-post violation penalty imply that our constraint (9) is then imposed (in expected value terms) on the end-of-period capital , i.e.
takes the form: k t k reg , rather than on beginning-of-period capital. This makes the problem of the bank more realistic as the intermediary can never be sure with probability 1 whether it complies with the capital requirement at the end of the period (which is after the exogenous portfolio default rate, p t , is realized).
We will show that in our setup raising capital requirements will have an impact on actual capital held (and thus also on overall credit conditions) by the bank even when actual capital already exceeds both the old 
Regulatory penalties
In practice most banks hold capital ratios in excess of the minimum required by nancial regulators. Possible explanations for this phenomenon that are recognized in the economic literature include capital adjustment costs, negative market signaling related to additional equity issuance (Myers and Majluf (1984) ), also leading to adjustment costs; and nally regulatory nes and compulsory recapitalizations, which we focus on. The key idea behind the impact of regulatory penalties on capital buers is that as banks have to satisfy capital regulations on an ongoing basis, additional capital lowers the probability of falling under the regulatory minimum and bearing costs following such event.
Under Bank to halt its dividend payments and to submit a plan to raise additional capital in response to the bank's Tier 1 capital falling to a level of 3.3%. 7
To incorporate regulatory penalties and their impact on banks' capital decisions in the theoretical setting of Section 2, we impose a penalty -in form of a forced recapitalization -for not meeting capital requirements at the end of the period. In our model dividends can only be paid out when the end-of-period capital exceeds the minimum ratio required, so introducing additional constraints on dividend payments as a regulatory penalty for non-compliance with capital requirements is not meaningful within our setting. Also, because we do not consider agency problems between shareholders and bank managers, temporary control over bank's management has no impact within our framework and hence is not considered as a regulatory penalty measure. Finally, intensied bank monitoring can be viewed as imposing extra costs on the bank in our model and is thus similar to an ex-post ne.
Below we present two alternative specications of the regulatory penalty that we introduced in the theoretical setting from Section 2. Both take the form of a forced recapitalization imposed by the regulator on a non-complying bank, both are temporary and proportional to the size of the minimum requirement violation. We would like to stress that these features of our ex-post violation penalties stay in opposition to a standard way of modeling regulatory penalties present in the literature, i.e. via xed ex-post nes.
While a ne is a more severe penalty than a forced recapitalization and thus gives even stronger incentives to hold positive excess capital to a bank, it is dicult to imagine that in reality a regulator would punish an already weakly capitalized bank by taking even more capital from it and hence worsening its nancial stability even further. Of course, we recognize that in real world compulsory raising extra common equity in a situation of nancial distress can be also very problematic (for sure very costly) for a bank 8 . On the other hand, however, such compulsory recapitalization should increase bank's nancial soundness at least in the long-term and, all in all, to prevent banks from holding too low actual capital ratios, an ex-post penalty should actually be painful for the bank.
Forced recapitalization
In this setup, when a bank's common equity to total assets ratio falls below the regulatory minimum at the end of current period, the minimum capital requirement for next period for this bank is increased. This forced recapitalization takes a form of an additional condition on the common equity ratio:
where the temporary increase in the capital requirement is proportional to the size of the current period violation. Moreover, if in period t + 1 the penalized bank does not comply with the new higher capital 7 Source: eba.europa.eu, federalreserve.gov. minimum, the compulsory requirement will be raised further in period t + 2, and so on. 9
For the bank, the direct costs of the forced recapitalization are proportional to the dierence between the cost of common equity and other sources of funds (since now a higher amount of common equity has to be held instead of cheaper deposits or subordinate debt). The Bellman equation (8) takes the form:
subject to the incentive constraint (6), the balance sheet clearing condition, the capital requirement (9), and where the additional term REC t represents the expected costs of non-compliance and is equal to:
We measure the opportunity cost of additional capital that bank has to hold because of the temporarily higher minimum requirement by taking the dierence between the cost of capital, r k , and deposits interest rate, r d , as in expectations the cost of deposits and subordinate debt is the same as a consequence of our risk neutrality assumptions. The discount factor 1 r k is used as the loss is incurred in the next period, t + 1.
Forced recapitalization with a market penalty
In an alternative model version we keep the same form of the ex-post violation penalty (increased minimum capital requirement for the next period) but consider another specication of the costs related to the forced recapitalization:
Using the squared root of the capital requirement violation implies a higher than one-to-one penalty 10 .
The formula chosen also implies a penalty cost that is concave in the extent of non-compliance (shortfall with respect to the required capital ratio), i.e. the marginal penalty is decreasing in the size of violation. The primary motivation for this specication is that it is a simple way of modeling additional costs of violating capital requirements, for example related to the negative signal about the bank's nancial condition that such violations give to the market. In addition, it can be expected that, after passing the minimum threshold, further falls in the capital ratio below the regulatory minimum do matter, but increasingly less so, as they do not possess the same informational value as passing the minimum itself; hence the choice of a concave cost function.
Taking a squared root of the penalty should be treated as a way to account for the additional market penalty for not meeting capital requirements that is beyond the control of the regulatory authority but does 9 This makes sure that temporarily higher capital requirements also bite for banks that already choose capital levels above the regulatory minimum.
10 As all the violations are in terms of fractions, squaring them would lower the prescribed penalty signicantly.
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have an impact on the bank. The rationale for this alternative penalty specication is based on the recently expressed opinion of the the World Savings Bank Institute 11 on the proposal of a countercyclical buer under Basel III: We remain highly skeptical of the fact that banks would be allowed, by the market, the rating agencies or even their supervisors, to actually use their buer when the economic situation deteriorates. We recall the recent experience in the latest crisis when market expectations (and also regulators' demands at that time) forbid banks to reduce their capital base. On the contrary, they had to boost it immediately.
(WSBI (2010)). This view of WSBI, besides expressing concerns over feasibility of the countercyclical buer, points at existence of other than regulatory, i.e. market or reputational, penalties for not meeting capital requirements, and justies considering penalty costs in the form of (12).
Numerical methods and calibration
Numerical Approach In solving the bank's constrained optimization problem (3) we followed the dy- In most cases annual values are reported in the literature as estimates corresponding to our model parameters, so we decompose these annual values into quarterly equivalents. For example, we obtain quarterly gross interest rates by applying a simple compounding interest rule (i.e. the annual gross interest rate is equal to the quarterly rate to the power four). The quarterly unconditional portfolio default probability is obtained by applying a simple rule of thumb and dividing the corresponding annual value by four. However, under Basel provisions the capital minimum requirements are calculated to cover one-year-ahead loan losses with a given probability. Therefore, when calculating the minimum requirements, we use the Basel-II formulas for corporate exposures of one-year maturity (and thus apply one year default probabilities). In addition, the temporarily higher capital requirement imposed in case of a capital requirements' violation is also assumed to hold for a one-year time span.
11 The WSBI is a global institution representing interests of savings and retail banks.
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The real (gross) cost of common equity is set to 1.06 on annualized basis, in line with the calibration in Elizalde and Repullo (2007 
Capital, risk and regulatory tightness
We begin with an analysis of the impact of regulatory tightening. In the upper panel of Figure 3 we show the response of various capital concepts to increases in α, the condence level regulators require when setting minimum capital ratios (where α varies from 0.99 to 0.999), keeping other parameters xed at their baseline levels reported in Table 1 . Of course, the desired capital when ignoring all restrictions (economic capital)
is not aected by changes in α at all: it is a at line at 0.5%, which is also the minimum value of common equity allowed in our grid 12 . Regulatory capital requirements do respond, given the way they are set: the solid line indicates that as α increases over the range considered, the regulatory capital requirement increases from 2.5% to almost double that level (4.4%). And when an ex-post minimum requirement violation does not lead to any penalties, actual (i.e. constrained optimal) capital stays right at the required level, since the latter is above the economic capital ratio over the entire range considered. This is the standard view expressed in the literature: capital is either at its economic level or at the required ratio, whichever of the two is higher.
However, that changes when penalties for ex-post requirement violation are introduced. Simply being forced to recapitalize up until the new required ratio already introduces a wedge between the actual capital and the required capital ratio, which however is very small and hence almost invisible in the upper panel of Figure 3 . But the stronger recapitalization plus market reputation penalty leads to a substantial wedge.
This result brings the model behavior substantially closer to empirically observed relationships, and has strong policy implications: even when actual capital is signicantly above the ratios required by the regulator, raising regulatory capital requirements will nevertheless have a signicant impact on banks' desired capital holdings. This is clearly of crucial importance for an analysis of the (macro)economic consequences of tightening capital standards.
The bottom panel of Figure 3 shows that for higher unconditional portfolio default rates (here forp = 4%) the actual capital ratio also for the (less severe) forced recapitalization penalty is visibly higher than the regulatory requirement. Moreover, the economic capital ratio is no longer chosen at the minimum level allowed by the grid (it increases withp).
12 Economic capital is chosen at a higher level once the unconditional portfolio default risk,p, representing the level of risk in the economy, increases. For example, forp = 0.04 the economic capital is set at 0.8% (bottom panel of Figure 3 ). However, we obtain rather low values of economic capital in general. This happens as subordinate debt, in absence of any direct default costs, substittes out common equity. In particular, because of our risk neutrality assumption, the spreads between subordinate debt return rates and the risk-free rate are an exact one-to-one mapping from the bank's portfolio unconditional default probabilities.
However, it is widely recognized in the literature that default risk alone cannot explain the empirically observed interest rate spreads (Huang and Huang (2003) ), which are much higher than theoretical models on corporate defaultable bonds would suggest. As a result of the neutrality assumption, our subordinate debt interest rates are thus relatively modest, which explains the strict preference of bank managers towards subordinate debt over common equity in the model with no capital regulations (i.e. low economic capital levels). Figure 4 ) but rise more than eightfold as the default probabilityp goes up from 1 to 10%, with a commensurate rise in the variancep(1 −p). As a result, regulatory capital again exceeds its economic counterpart for all levels of the unconditional default probability considered (for economic capital to exceed the regulatory level, α needs to be at the low end of the range considered here, andp at the high end). And of course, the model without ex-post violation penalties again sets actual capital equal to regulatory capital under these circumstances.
Introducing ex-post violation penalties changes the picture entirely. For very low levels of the default risk the actual capital ratio is constrained by the regulatory requirement, but forp levels of 2% and higher banks will choose higher capital ratios than required even if the ex-post penalty consists of just the forced recapitalization. For the higher penalty -that includes a proxy for market reputation penalties -actual capital is chosen substantially higher than the regulatory ratios for all default probability values considered, and increasingly so asp rises (bottom panel, Figure 4 ).
Most importantly, for both penalty cost forms, actual capital grows more than the regulatory capital with the riskiness of the portfolio. In other words, the excess capital held by banks is positively correlated with the level of the risk. This happens, as the probability of violating minimum capital requirements increases inp: while regulatory requirements rise with the risk in the economy, the expected returns of the bank do not increase (the interest rate on bank's portfolio adjusts to match the xed intermediation margin of 0.01). Of course, at the same time a higher share of common equity in the bank's liabilities reduces the return payments to bank's creditors and hence protects it from both default as well as requirement violation.
Nevertheless, it follows from the numerical results that the bank has to increase its actual capital by more than the rise in the minimum capital requirement to counteract the higher probability of violating the new requirement.
This result has an important implication: with ex-post violation penalties, the risk-based capital regu- 13 We reasonably assume that the level of risk and the default probability are negatively correlated with GDP over the cycle 14 Furne (2001) shows that the introduction of Basel-I regulations, while raising the actual capital levels held by banks, played also a signicant role in the dramatic fall of commercial credit (known as credit crunch) in the early 1990s. Figure 4 : Economic, actual and regulatory capital for changing levels ofp and α = 0.999, for dierent model specications.
To facilitate comparison with the empirical literature, Table 2 : Regulatory, actual and excess capital for two penalty specications (as % of total assets). 
Responses to changes in other parameters
To asssess the robustness of our results, we also check the responses of dierent capital concepts to changes in other parameters of the model. Responses to shifts in the recoverable fraction of invested capital in case of distress, λ, the cost of equity, r k , and in the intermediation margin, δ, are presented in Figures 6-7 in Appendix 7D. These sensitivity checks yield predictable results: for example a higher recovery rate in case of corporate distress (higher λ) lowers the value at risk, leading to a commensurate fall in expected losses. As a result all concepts of capital decline, as does the gap between them. In particular the capital buer held in the case of reputational penalties (on the top of the recapitalization requirement) falls by almost a half compared to the λ = 0 case. A higher intermediation margin, δ, acts as buer and so leads to lower capital buer choices. Finally, increasing the cost of common equity shifts the preferences of the bank towards subordinate debt and deposits. According to the amendments to capital regulations to be implemented under Basel III, the amount of regulatory capital will increase signicantly as a share of risk-weighted assets. But the structure of minimum requirements will change too, with the proportion of Tier-1 capital to go up signicantly. One step in both directions (more and higher quality capital) is the creation of a compulsory conservation buer of 2.5% 15 . This will be equivalent to a rise of the overall capital requirement to 10.5% of RWA with a simultaneous increase of the Tier-1 capital share to approximately 8.4 percentage points (after including the additional increase in the share of Tier-1 capital in the base 8% requirement to 6 percentage points). Basel III also introduces a so-called countercyclical capital buer of up to 2.5% of RWA. It is expected to be implemented by mandating increases in the equity-to-assets ratio (of Tier-1 capital only) during periods of excessive credit growth and allowing drawing it down during periods of economic slack. In this way, the total capital requirement will reach 13% during expansions but will fall gradually to 10.5% of RWA during recessions. The introduction of this countercyclical element comes down to using a a family of risk functions, instead of a single risk function only (as under Basel II), to address the widely criticized pro-cyclical character of Basel-II capital provisions (Kashyap and Stein (2004)).
The above Basel-III provisions are about to be phased in, but the existing assessments of their expected eects in the literature so far have been based on mechanical application of simple cost-benet accounting exercises, without any explicit consideration of potential behavioral responses by the banks (e.g. Cournede and Slovik (2011)). Yet such responses (appearing as changes in capital buers held above regulatory capital ratios) may have a signicant impact on the likely macroeconomic consequences of Basel III. We therefore use the theoretical setup developed in Sections 2 and 3 to compare what we can expect banks' actual capital ratios to be under alternatively Basel-II and Basel-III regulations. We also extend the analysis to assess the expected impact of the countercyclical buer that is a part of Basel-III proposals.
But our model as set up in Section 2 is inappropriate for an analysis of the degree of procyclicality of the system because the risk level, measured by the unconditional portfolio default rate,p, is treated as exogenous and xed. In order to assess the cyclicality of capital requirements, we thus need to make the model environment dynamic and introduce a business cycle into it. To do so we letp take on two values, corresponding to expansion and recession times. Formally, we allow for two possible states of the economy:
y t ∈ {0, 1}. y t = 0 corresponds to a recession and y t = 1 to an expansion period. The variable y t is assumed to follow a rst-order Markov process, with the following transition probabilities matrix, based on estimates from a regime-switching model for US GDP quarterly data (for period 1959Q1-2011Q2): 16 We again use the rule of thumb to derive quarterly default probabilities based on annual values taken from the data.
Moreover, the values of annual unconditional default probabilities are in line with Repullo and Suarez (2012) , who conduct a similar analysis of pro-cyclicality of the excess capital held by banks in a simple overlapping generation model. However, they do not consider the impact of regulatory penalties. See Appendix 7C for calibration details.
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To compare changes to be introduced under Basel III with current Basel-II provisions, we calibrate the regulatory capital ratio, which now will be dierent in the two states of the economy (we use k 
4.3.2
The impact of the Basel-III countercyclical buer on the overall cyclicality of the system of capital requirements Table 3 contains the results of this numerical exercise for three alternative specications of capital requirements: (A) Basel II regulations, (B) increased total capital requirement under Basel III but without the countercyclical buer, and (C) case (B) plus the countercyclical buer; Case C thus represents Basel III completely as far is its impact on overall capital requirements is concerned. We used equation (12) to model the ex-post penalty, i.e. we included the reputational aspects of requirements violation and not the lighter variant.
After deriving actual capital choices in the two states of nature numerically, a simple simulation exercise was performed. The variable p t was drawn one million times for each of the above cases. For each draw, given the regulatory minimum requirement and bank's actual capital, the end-of-period common equity (k t ) was calculated. Our simulation exercises also show that when ex-post penalties are not incorporated to the model, the bank does not comply with regulatory requirements every 7 out of 100 quarters, but once they are in place, banks are only out of compliance in 2 out of 1000 quarters, a decline by a factor 35, bringing this measure more in line with observed frequencies.
18 See Table 5 We contribute to the discussion over the role of Tier-2 capital by investigating the bail-in proposal within our theoretical setting from Section 2: the subordinate debt introduced there as a funding source can be interpreted as Tier-2 capital. Subordinate debt plays a double role in our framework: it increases the moral hazard friction, but at the same time it is a potential market-disciplining tool via the interest rate r e t since the latter increases in the default risk (thus, we can investigate the direct market-disciplining role of Tier-2 capital, i.e. via the impact of the risk-sensitive interest rate on funding costs for the bank). In this setting raising minimum capital requirements, by increasing actual capital ratios, should lower the uncertainty over payos to subordinate debt owners and hence lower the interest rate they willvdemand for given levels of subordinate debt. In the analysis that follows we want to verify by how much the risk-sensitivity of the subordinate-debt interest rate would decrease after introduction of the European Commission's plans.
We start by plotting the subordinate debt interest rate, r e t , corresponding to dierent levels of portfolio risk,p, for the Basel-II minimum level of subordinate debt,ē = 0.04, in Figure 5 (upper panel). The plot shows that the interest rate responds the most to increasing portfolio risk when no ex-post violation penalties are present. Introducing such regulatory penalties signicantly reduces -because of increased actual capital ratios -the responsiveness of r e t to the level of risk. In fact, the line representing r e t is almost entirely at when reputational costs of non-compliance are also accounted for. We conclude that the higher level of common equity, the smaller the market disciplining role of subordinate debt. Thus the two proposals (Basel-III and the EU proposal on bail-in capital) seem to some extent to work at cross purposes. If we are right, if the suggested changes in Tier-1 capital requirements under Basel III would lead -as our analysis shows -to signicant increases in actual capital ratios and a much reduced market disciplining eect of Tier-2 capital, then requiring these high bail-out ratio's is probably unnecessary and ineective, as many studies suggest (Turner (2009) Table 4 below.
As one might expect, when the steady state ratio,ē, is increased, subordinate debt substitutes for common equity in the absence of capital regulations preventing that: the economic capital ratio is now the lowest one allowed by the grid for all considered levels of risk,p. On the contrary, introducing minimum capital requirements motivates banks to hold actual capital ratios well above the economic capital ratio, just like what comes out for the old, lower level ofē. This suggests a justication for introducing higher capital requirements into the banking sector to prevent a detererioration of the quality of capital once the strong bail-in requirements are introduced. It also shows that in presence of capital requirements the share of subordinate debt following the bail-in proposal will be increased at the expense of the deposits share in a bank's total liabilities. In the presence of ex-post violation penalties banks will be unwilling also to reduce their capital buers (held in excess of the regulatory minimum) to compensate for the increased subordinate debt level so it has to come from somewhere else. to dierent levels ofp is almost entirely at. As higher amount of subordinate debt held implies lower level of deposits (with actual capital falling only slightly and hence remaining on a relatively high level), the probability of a bank's default decreases further, lowering the premium demanded by subordinate debt holders. Of course, increasing the share of subordinate debt in banks' liabilities lowers the probability of a default and hence the need of a government's intervention (as now losses will be borne to a higher extent by capital owners). However, the above exercise shows that a too high level of subordinate-debt-types capital (i.e. subject to a write-down) reduces their market disciplining role further.
Conclusions and possible extensions
So far, the standard way of modeling capital requirements in the literature has been to assume that they aect banks' actual capital choices only when they bind, i.e. that a bank opts for an amount of own capital higher than the regulatory minimum only if the latter is anyway lower than the economic capital preferred by the bank in absence of any regulations. Otherwise the bank always chooses to hold actual capital equal to the minimum required, which implies zero capital buers. But it is a strong stylized fact that banks hold own capital in excess of the regulatory minimum. In this study we explain the abovementioned empirical evidence by pointing at existence and implications of ex-post regulatory and market penalties for not meeting capital requirements. In the presence of such anticipated penalties, banks choose actual capital higher than the regulatory requirement for all levels of portfolio risk considered. Importantly, we also show that adjustments in those capital buers to changes in capital requirements can have a substantial impact on the evaluation of regulatory frameworks: the same policies can in fact lead to dierent outcomes (in terms of achieved actual capital ratios, the procyclicality of the system, etc.) once such behavioral responses of banks are correctly accounted for. Key conclusions of our analysis can be outlined as follows:
Positive excess capital. does not reduce the pro-cyclical character of capital requirements. But we show that introduction of a countercyclical buer, aimed at resembling a two-risk-curve capital requirements schedule and provisioned under Basel III, is highly desirable because it signicantly reduces procyclical uctuations in actual capital.
To our knowledge -so far no one has attempted to evaluate the quantitative impact of the countercyclical Basel-III buer on actual capital uctuations. Our results suggest that the impact of even the limited 2.5% buer envisaged will be considerable.
Market-disciplining role of Tier-2 capital negatively aected by the level of common equity.
The Tier-2-types of capital, such as subordinate debt, are supposed to serve as a market disciplining tool, limiting the risk taken by banks. However, in presence of capital requirements and ex-post violation penalties the actual capital levels are much higher and the interest rate on subordinate debt is much less sensitive to changes in the level of risk than in absence of such regulations. Thus, capital minima, together with ex-post regulatory and market penalties for not meeting them, can actually negatively aect the adequacy of Tier-2 capital for macroprudential goals.
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Capital requirements to be set below the socially optimal capital level to achieve the latter.
Although derivation of the socially optimal capital level is beyond the scope of this paper, the presence of ex-post non-compliance penalties has implications that are worth stressing. That is, if social welfare is maximized at a certain level of capital ratios, the regulator should set capital requirements below that socially optimal capital level, as in general the actual capital held by the banks will exceed the regulatory minimum once the market and regulatory penalties are accounted for. This conclusion is especially important in presence of market penalties which are beyond control of regulatory authorities.
Our model is admittedly a very simplied description of regulatory practices and the capital choices banks make. Nevertheless, we obtain results that are in line with empirical evidence and seem to have substantial policy relevance. A desirable extension of our model would be to endogenize the portfolio risk decision. In the future we also plan to investigate the channels through which banks adjust to capital requirements more in detail: distinguishing between cosmetic changes like reduction in total asset size with simultaneous increase in the portfolio risk versus more structural changes like increasing the capital base and reducing risk exposure. Another extension of the analysis presented here would involve distinguishing between dierent regulatory policies available to regulators in case of requirements violation and investigation of their macroeconomic implications. Regulatory penalties and countercyclical buer: a numerical exercise using model with and without violation penalties . Values of common equity, subordinate debt, deposits and retained earnings reported as % of assets. 40 
